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BOOK REVIEW
and a demand was necessary in order to put the vendor in default.0 No
demand having been made upon him the vendor was not in default at the
time he delivered, or at least tendered, the deed to appellee.
The cases on this subject have generally arisen in a different procedure
from the instant case, the plaintiff being the party who failed to establish
a default by making a demand for performance. Thus, the courts have
often employed language to the effect that a demand is necessary "before an
action can be brought." However, inasmuch as the objective in this type of
case is to determine whether or not there has been a default in performance,
it would seem to be incumbent upon the party asserting nonperformance to
establish the default of the other, whether that assertion be made in an
affirmative capacity or as a defense to an action brought against him.' 0
The decision of the appellate court in holding the appellee bound to make
a demand for delivery of the deed seems in this respect supportable. R. H. N.
BOOK REVIEW
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAV OF PROPERTY, American Law Institute Publishers,
St. Paul, Minn.
These two volumes represent the initial effort toward the publication in
book form of the Restatement of the Law of Property by the American Law
Institute. From the Introduction-Division I-one learns that three more volumes
are to be published in this Restatment.
Volume I, entitled "Introduction and Freehold Estates," covers definitions
of general terms and terms relating to estates in chapters 1 and 2, and the
creation of and general characteristics of estates in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Volume II, entitled "Future Interests-Parts 1 and 2," covers the definitions,
creation and characteristics of Future Interests, this work to be completed in
the future in Volume III.
These two volumes follow the usual style of the Restatements heretofore
published by the Institute. The principle of law or the text is in bold type
and under each statement of text is accompanying comment, followed by
examples.
The stark precision of the language of the text does not make easy reading,
but leaves little room for ambiguity as a more liquid prose might do; however,
without any critical petulance, it might be wished that the text could have
been edited by a Holmes or a Cardozo. While the criticism to follow is
pertinent to all Restatements of the Institute, this writer sincerely believes it is
regrettable that there is so little explanation of the reasoning and of the
authority on which the presumably restated text is based.
9See note (7), supra.
10 Northup v. Scott (1914), 148 N. Y. S. 846, 85 Misc. Rep. 515: "Where the
time for performance of a contract is not fixed t - 0 it is presumed the
parties intended a reasonable time * 0 * In such case it would be in-
cumbent on either party desirous of preserving any legal remedy or availing
himself of a defense at law for a breach of the contract, to put the other
party in default by tendering performance on his part and demanding per-
formance by the other party within a reasonable time specified."
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We are told in the general introduction that the object of the Institute is
"to present an orderly statement of the general common law of the United
States * * *" that "the ever-increasing volume of the decisions of the courts,
establishing new rules or precedents, and the numerous instances in which
the decisions are irreconcilable, * * * will force the abandonment of our
common law system * * * and the adoption in its place of rigid legislative
codes, unless a new factor promoting certainty and clarity can be found."
On this statement of fact and purpose, we may properly inquire upon what
reasoning was the orderly statement of the common law selected and what
was the state of authority on the point on which the selection was made.
The only suggested solution for this problem presented by these volumes
is found in the "Special Notes," "Caveats," and "Monographs." Volume I has
thirty-eight special notes; Volume II has twenty-two. The great majority
of these cite legislative enactments on the point set out in the text. Volume I
has eight caveats and Volume II has nineteen most of which state that "the
Institute takes no position * * ,,
In the Appendix to Volume I are two monographs applying "to Sections in
which the rule of law stated is contrary to an impression believed to be
widely entertained by the profession," and entitled "Dower and curtesy as
derivative estates" and "Implication of cross remainders in deeds." Volume II
has three such monographs, entitled "The Severability of a Power of Termina-
tion," "Ineffectiveness of an Ultimate Executory Interest," and "Aspects of the
Law of Acceleration and Sequestration." Surely these are not the only rules of
law set out in the Restatement upon which the profession and the courts hold
contrary views. The writer acknowledges that state annotations to the
Restatement will correct this paucity of rationale and authority to some extent.
But when the state annotations do not agree with the restated principles,
then the need for a more comprehensive reporting of the general state of the
authorities and of the reasons of the Institute is increased.
We believe that these are weaknesses in the Restatement, and will detract
from its value as authority. However, these volumes constitute an excellent
text and summary for student review.
We fully realize the tremendous amount of material and research behind
these volumes, but it is not available to the practicing lawyer who presents
the statement of the law to the courts nor to the courts who make the common
law and who must justify their decisions by some reasoning, and annotate them
with some case authority, presented to them, whether the decision is right
or wrong.
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